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How peer-review constrains
cognition: on the frontline in the
knowledge sector
Stephen J. Cowley*
Centre for Human Interactivity and the COMAC Cluster–Department of Language and Communication, University of
Southern Denmark, Slagelse, Denmark
Peer-review is neither reliable, fair, nor a valid basis for predicting ‘impact’: as quality
control, peer-review is not fit for purpose. Endorsing the consensus, I offer a reframing:
while a normative social process, peer-review also shapes the writing of a scientific
paper. In so far as ‘cognition’ describes enabling conditions for flexible behavior,
the practices of peer-review thus constrain knowledge-making. To pursue cognitive
functions of peer-review, however, manuscripts must be seen as ‘symbolizations’,
replicable patterns that use technologically enabled activity. On this bio-cognitive view,
peer-review constrains knowledge-making by writers, editors, reviewers. Authors are
prompted to recursively re-aggregate symbolizations to present what are deemed
acceptable knowledge claims. How, then, can recursive re-embodiment be explored? In
illustration, I sketch how the paper’s own content came to be re-aggregated: agonistic
review drove reformatting of argument structure, changes in rhetorical ploys and careful
choice of wordings. For this reason, the paper’s knowledge-claims can be traced
to human activity that occurs in distributed cognitive systems. Peer-review is on the
frontline in the knowledge sector in that it delimits what can count as knowing. Its
systemic nature is therefore crucial to not only discipline-centered ‘real’ science but
also its ‘post-academic’ counterparts.
Keywords: peer-review, distributed language, distributed cognition, languaging, ecological psychology,
embodied cognition, representation, epistemology
INTRODUCTION
Recent decades have seen shifts in the academy –changes in how people view science, cognition,
language and, for related reasons, the nature of social practices. For many, academics no longer
strive to unlock the secrets of art and nature but, rather, as professionals in a knowledge sector,
they combine teaching with research. A world of what Ziman (2000) calls post-academic science
is altering the values of the discipline based research of the last century. For Ziman (2000,
p. 173), the interdisciplinary focus of post-academic science is organized by market principles and
dedicated to the accomplishment of practical goals. Others report on similar changes: Mirowski
(2011) challenges the marketization of science and Readings (1996) decries the emergence of a
‘post historical’ university. These changes in academia are due, in part, to markets, information
technology, globalization, and the digitalization of documents (often, bizarrely, referred to as
‘knowledge’)1.
1As Giere (2004) argues, scientiﬁc knowledge (at least) is necessarily distributed between individuals and communities.
Digitalization either reformats the digitized or transforms analog signals into digital formats (below, called ‘symbolizations’).
As digitalized products lack semantic properties, they can neither be nor represent any kind of ‘knowledge’.
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In pursuing such changes, like Ziman (2000), I focus on
what self-deﬁned communities regard as scientific knowledge.2
Taking a broad view of knowing, I focus on editorial peer-review.
Having overviewed the literature of the ﬁeld (while striving
to be ‘disinterested’), I suggest that peer-review is more than
normative. Rather, peer-review is cognitive in a precise sense;
it creates enabling/disabling conditions for the ﬂexible behavior
that shapes academic publications. Peer-review uses, not just
Merton’s (1942) scientiﬁc values, but also how editors, authors,
reviewers and others adapt as they enact institutional practices.
At coarse levels of granularity, all parties aﬀect knowledge-
making. Reviewers are crucial in, at least, Ziman’s (2000) real
science –value driven practice that contrasts with what he
calls the Legend.3 By real science, Ziman (2000) focuses on
practices whereby research communities deﬁne the assumptions
and knowledge that is taken to constitute the framework of a
scientiﬁc discipline.
Cognition and Knowledge
Historically, individual cognition was opposed to the knowledge
that a group hold common. In the West, the dominant
view of ‘cognition’ built on rationalist–empiricist debate and,
speciﬁcally, the view that individual ‘minds’ represent knowledge
of an objective world. On that view, knowledge production
becomes a social process that depends on individuals and,
above all, minds and/or brains. Inﬂuentially, Drucker (1969)
related this to the economic concerns of a ‘knowledge economy’.
The concept took on new functions which Gibbons et al.’s
(1994) coinage of ‘Mode 2 knowledge’– ways of knowing
that aspire to achieve social, political, or economic advantage.
For Ziman (2000), post-academic science separates knowledge
from ‘disciplines’ and, in their stead, seeks validation from
industry, government, or society. In such a usage, the focus
is, not the individual, but the process. Below, however, I
follow neither Descartes nor Drucker. Rather, like Giere (2004),
I treat human intelligence as necessary to making, revising
and maintaining all scientiﬁc knowledge: science and peer-
review are paradigms of cognitive activity. Human cognition
is thus deﬁned as that which enables ﬂexible, adaptive
behavior.
The paper leaves aside debate on the origins or nature of
human intelligence. Rather, it regards organism–environment
relations as the likely basis for all knowledge making. Broadly,
this is embodied cognition (for an overview, see Shapiro,
2010); however, in asking how peer-review serves science,
I stress the transformational role of cultural objects. The
paradigm cases become, for example, how people, say, bring
2Even if the OED’s Sense 5 of science, is the . . . “dominant one in common use”
(according to a 1987 Supplement), I view science as Wissenschaft and not around
the usage ﬁrst attested in 1867: “We shall . . . use the word science” in the sense that
Englishmen so commonly give it; as expressing physical and experimental science,
to the exclusion of the theological and metaphysical.” (W. G. Ward in The Dublin
Review)
3Ziman (2000, p. 2), the ‘Legend’ refers to a mythical ‘all conquering method’ that
is exempliﬁed by physics and chemistry. This narrow view obscures what most
scientists do: for Ziman (2000), they use Merton’s (1942) ideals which, he argues,
are being replaced by those of post-academic science: writing in 2000, he claims
that it is too early to judge the eﬀects of this change.
a ship into port (Hutchins, 1995) or design, build, operate,
and construe output from the Hubble telescope (Giere, 2004).
On this systemic perspective,4 reviewers drive the recursive
activity of peer-review by scrutinizing a document’s images,
texts and data (later, called ‘symbolizations’). Cognition is as
social as it is individual: intelligent decision-making arises in
the multi-scalar coupling of brain, body, and world. While
much depends on platforms and computer hardware, scientiﬁc
expertise serves in making and evaluating cultural products.
The power of a publication lies in, not just materiality, but
how people use inscriptions data and graphics to connect
up experience, language, and culture. Language is thus traced
to, not just brains, but how people coordinate action with
both text and a history of making and hearing articulatory
and gestural movements. Though based in bodily activity,
writing-systems grant language a new historicity. As a result,
language is, at once, embodied and amenable to description
as verbal pattern (indeed, it is often confused with such
patterns).5 The symbiotic nature of language activity ensures
that, like navigating a ship or using the Hubble, peer-review
is a distributed cognitive process. In the terms of Hollan
et al. (2000), such processes are social, draw on artifacts
and, above all, how cultural products can transform later
behavior. Language – and document co-construction – links
neurophysiological dynamics with judgements about the sense
of perceived wordings. On this distributed perspective, far
from being an inner system (or code), language is deﬁned
as activity in which wordings play a part (Cowley, 2011,
2014)6.
Even reading uses anticipatory saccading (see, Järvilehto
et al., 2011): though neurophysiology is needed, historicity
enables persons to link movements, interpersonal experience,
and verbal pattern. While embodiment ensures the ontogenetic
emergence of language, many practices are dominated by
digitized patterns. In the practices of peer-review, inscriptions
aid all parties in assembling descriptions of collecting, cleaning
and processing data, reporting results, and discussing ﬁndings.
They connect up graphics, inscriptions and electronic data
such that, ideally, a reader could replicate what is described.
Since persons make, construe and transform documents, peer-
review is more than a normative institution. From this
systemic perspective, peer-review is reframed as enabling and
4Cowley and Vallée-Tourangeau (2013) defend the usage by linking distributed
cognition (Hutchins, 1995) to interactivity or sense-saturated coordination (see,
Maturana’s (1978); Steﬀensen, 2013; Kirsh, 2015; to structural coupling (Maturana,
1978), one comes to focus on interactivity or sense-saturated coordination
(Steﬀensen, 2013; Kirsh, 2015). In a cultural ecosystem (Hutchins, 2014), the
impersonal aspect of language and experience makes cognition diachronic
(Neumann and Cowley, 2013).
5Linell’s (2004)Written language bias in linguistics is the classic work that identiﬁes
the widespread error. Emphasizing that language (and people) are fundamentally
dialogical, he shows over 100 ways in which linguists are led astray when
inscriptions are used as the basis for models of ‘language’.
6On a distributed view, wordings are contrasted with words; whereas words are
abstract, wordings are nonce events that are perceived and construed in the course
of embodied and socio-cultural experience. While wordings are experiential, like
words (and what are called ‘symbolizations’), they are also amenable to analysis as
verbal patterns.
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disabling knowledge making. Accordingly, it is hypothesized
that:
• Multi-scalar recursive activity connects knowledge claims with
what a community are likely to accept. Among other things,
peer-review draws on:
◦ Using agonistic evaluation to create, constrain, and
delimit how symbolizations are to be conﬁgured (and
claims made).
◦ Recursive re-embodiment of symbolizations that reformat
a document as (a) conforming to standard views of
topics/debates; (b) narrowing and/or moving beyond a
problem space; and (c) introducing contingencies that
lead to unexpected changes in the ﬁnal product.
◦ Prompting authorial change in, for example, (a) argument
structure; (b) knowledge claims; (c) presentational style;
and (d) the selection of wordings. Changes appear
as symbolizations are replaced, revised, retained, and
reconﬁgured.
Before pursuing the hypothesis, I oﬀer an overview of the
dominant approach while drawing heavily on Bornmann’s (2011)
work. In so doing, I evaluate the ‘object’ of peer-review by linking
his ﬁndings to a wide range of approaches that treat peer-review
as a kind of ‘quality control’. Having sketched a consensus view
of the state of the art, in section “Other Framings”, I turn to
dissenting views and use these to place peer-review in a cognitive
frame.
Peer-review: The Semi-official History
Merton (1942) ensured that editorial peer-review came to be
seen as a normative process. Not only does his view frame
Bornmann’s (2011) approach but, among others, it grounds
Ziman’s (2000) account of science and Huutoniemi’s (2015)
recent encyclopedia entry. On this model, a manuscript is
input that is evaluated to reach an output or a decision
for publication or rejection (Figure 1). As a standard social
practice, peer-review serves an institutional function in a ‘middle
world’ (Merton, 1942). Science is idealized as accumulating
potentially true and secure knowledge based on CUDOS values –
Communalism, Universalism, Disinterestedness, and Organized
Skepticism. Today, disinterestedness is underplayed and, as in
Merton’s later work, some insert the criterion of ‘Originality’:
like Huutoniemi (2015), many echo Popper’s critical scrutiny of
‘knowledge claims’ and treat organized skepticism as deﬁning
scientiﬁc practice.
Peer-review is often traced to the Enlightenment (e.g., Godlee,
2002; Ioannidis, 2005; Bornmann, 2011; Smith, 2011; Park
et al., 2014).7 Wikipedia is not alone in, perhaps inaccurately
(Ravaud, 2015), attributing the ‘ﬁrst recorded’ pre-publication
peer editorial to the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal
Society.8 Assuming its enlightened nature, many stress that the
7On May 25, 2015, this claim was veriﬁed on Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Peer_review
8The Royal Society followed the footsteps of the Le Journal des Savants; however,
this appeared less regularly than the Transactions and, so, its pioneering role can
be questioned.
‘process’ was institutionalized after the Second World War.
In that it reduces peer-review to changes in ‘form’, appeal to
institutionalization is anything but trivial. There is, of course,
dissent; for Gould (2013) peer-review arose from ‘censorship
and inquisition’ (Gaudet, 2014) and, turning from a process
view, while Hirschauer (2009) stresses reciprocal accountability,
Gaudet (2014) underlines its bounding function. For Pontille
and Torny (2015), as a technology, peer-review ties evaluation to
aggregated epistemic judgements (validation). Before pursuing its
role in knowledge-making, I present Bornmann’s (2011) view of
how peer-review appears when pictured as a social process used
in academic evaluation or quality control.
Evaluation
By presenting peer-review as enlightened, its own ideals can
be examined against normative categories. Bornmann (2011)
asks if decisions are reliably obtained, free of bias and if
the results have predictive validity. He echoes, for example,
Reinhart’s (2010) contrast between ‘quality assurance’ and ‘self-
regulation’. On the input–output view, process-variations (e.g.,
pre vs. post publication review) name independent variables that
ground hypotheses and models. Investigations can thus build
on constructs like eﬃciency (operationalized as time-taken to
review) and eﬀective selection (operationalized by measures of
quality).
Since the 1980s, a consensus has arisen –as shared by, for
example, Bedeian (2003), Hirschauer (2009), Bornmann (2011),
and Gaudet (2014). Building on empirical extensions of Merton’s
(1942) work, this is deeply inﬂuenced by biomedical concerns.
In large part, this is due to the importance of sound evidence
in health science and how, since 1989, the Journal of the
American Medical Association (JAMA) has run conferences on
the topic.
Where science is taken to advance in a linear way,
progress is ascribed to consensus. In reviews of quality, one
expects consistency; if reviewers were ‘fair’, outcomes would be
psychologically reliable. However, this is not so: in a well-known
example, Ernst et al. (1993) sent a paper submitted to a medical
journal to 45 experts. When checked against chance, inter-rater
agreement fell in the range of 0.2–0.4. Although, generally,
there is more concord in recommendations for acceptance
than rejections (c.f., Weller, 2002), reliability is poor across
all such studies (Bornmann, 2011). Further, consensus is, at
best, partial; few even ask about assumptions made, theories
used, or methods pursued. Moreover, the ‘unreliability’ of peer-
review applies to the natural sciences, the humanities and social
sciences. For Marsh et al. (2008), lack of acceptable agreement
among independent assessors is the major weakness of peer-
review. Some are not surprised. Lack of consensus can be traced
to diverse positions, backgrounds, criteria of judgment and,
occasionally, dissensus is valued (Bailar, 1991). Finally, some
think that a quest for reliability posits the wrong object of study
(Gaudet, 2014) and/or a distorted view of science. In any case,
‘good’ reviews, whatever those may be, are highly unlikely to be
reliable.
Peer-review features many kinds of bias. Indeed, Simon (1947,
1991) challenged Merton’s (1942) idealized view of reason by
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FIGURE 1 | An input–output model of peer review. When authors are seen as offering ‘input’, peer-review becomes an institutional decision-making process that
connects and editor, referees, and an electronic platform. The decision can be seen as ‘output’, and peer-review becomes a black-box.
showing that individual rationality is bounded. Building on
this, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) made bias central to the
psychology of decision making. Heuristics can be shown to
ground expertise both in the lab and elsewhere: while much is
now known about biases, heuristics and natural decision-making
(Kahneman, 2003; Klein, 2008; Thaler and Sunstein, 2008), peer-
review ignores such work. Where bias is studied, this is usually in
a loose or colloquial sense of the term: Bornmann (2011) counts
25 attested biases and reports no studies of how biases improve
peer-review. He shows that work may be undervalued when, for
example, reviewers draw on extraneous factors like perspective,
provenance, gender, etc. A ‘halo eﬀect’ appears when bad reasons
(e.g., cronyism) lead to over-valuation. Building on Cole et al.
(1981), most accept that, in reviewing large grants, a chance
element occurs. Further, even bias is systematic: Bornmann
(2011) shows how, at times, gender bias is marked and, at others,
disappears. Further, once reduced to a variable, it is unclear
if gender reﬂects lexico-grammatical markers (e.g., names and
pronouns) and/or how women/men write manuscripts (and their
parts).
Not only do reviewers fail to identify most inaccuracies but
they rarely identify malpractice (e.g., Ioannidis, 2005; Smith,
2011). While changes in detection render it hard to quantify,
as Retraction Watch shows, fraud is on the rise.9 Given the
rewards, cases are frequent in the biomedical sciences where
unethical conduct may be especially damaging. For Pontille and
Torny (2013), malpractice includes selective and positive bias in
reporting results, plagiarism (and self-plagiarism), guest and gift
authorship and, indeed, data falsiﬁcation. For example, in 2012
the Japanese Society of Anesthesiologists obliged Dr. Fuji of Toho
University to retract 172 (sic) articles that used falsiﬁed data.
Remarkably, Pontille and Torny (2013) ﬁnd that Dr. Fuji’s work
had been questioned as early as 2000 when a meta-analysis of 47
articles on anesthesia showed ‘remarkably identical frequencies
of headaches as side eﬀects’. Like conﬂicts of interest, fraud is
largely invisible to peer-review. Further, in cases such as working
in pharmaceuticals, academic research meshes with commercial
interests (see, Mirowski, 2011). Among its many dangers are
those of hiding data, focusing on positive results (e.g., Friedman
and Richter, 2004) and, of course, allowing pharmaceutical
9The remarkable blog http://retractionwatch.com/ oﬀers reports of detected
misdemeanors almost every day.
interests to support journals as Elsevier did (Hansen, 2012; cited
in Pontille and Torny, 2013). As ‘quality assurance’ peer-review is
unﬁt for purpose.
In treating peer-review as normative, emphasis falls on an
input–output process. Leaving knowledge aside, weight is placed
on how Merton’s (1942) CUDOS values (or similar) are brought
to bear on data and images and texts to give rise to a computer-
like decision process (see Figure 1). While predictive validity may
be a desideratum for grant applications, oddly, editorial peer-
review is often seen the same way. For example, Bornmann and
Daniel (2008) show that 95% of papers rejected by Science later
appeared elsewhere. Leaving aside the journal’s status, they ﬁnd
no generally valid rejection criteria. Often, rejected papers are
later accepted by journals of ‘higher’ standing (Weller, 2002).
Others seek to validate peer-review with citation counts. While
ﬁnding only ﬁve such studies, Bornmann (2011) reports a ‘rather
high degree of predictive validity’ in using citation to assess
editorial decisions. Yet, since these apply to a few Journals,
the results conﬂate a paper’s quality with a journal’s perceived
reputation. As Bornmann (2011) notes, high citation rates are
likely to correlate with a Journal’s visibility. Further, questionable
practices appear: in a study of journal ratings Pontille and Torny
(2010) treat the method as a scientiﬁc apparatus that also serves
as a political instrument. The ﬁeld’s diﬃculties arise from the
goal of deﬁning criteria that grant ‘quality’ to –not a published
paper –but a journal. In practice, appointed bodies use three sets
of criteria: ﬁrst, the journal’s procedures must meet international
standards of, above all, peer-review. Yet, to establish Journal
ratings intrinsic deﬁnitions (e.g., how journals are seen in a ﬁeld)
must, somehow, be squared with relational counterparts (e.g., an
acceptance level below 25%). Yet, for knowledge what matters
is, not the journal, but scientiﬁc content. And, by any epistemic
criterion, few publications have any impact at all10.
Other Framings
Not all treat peer-review as assuming a ‘linear understanding
of progress’ (Ochsner and Hug, 2014). Indeed, Ziman (2000)
sees unrealistic views of scientiﬁc method as part of the
10When ‘impact’ is deﬁned epistemically, it is striking that, even in prestigious
journals, many papers remain uncited (e.g., Hu and Wu, 2014); further, many
citations merely echo a phrase, list similar ﬁndings or endorse a theory, writer or
school (e.g., MacRoberts and MacRoberts, 2010). Pedagogically too, the impact of
research wanes as it is separated from teaching.
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Legend and, rejecting such ideas, Bedeian (2003) turns to
social constructivism. However, if science is heavily inﬂuenced
by contingencies and thus non-linear, one can hardly be
surprised that peer-review is unreliable, subject to bias and
weak in predictive validity. How, could reviewers identify the
future impact of the unexpected (especially where indicators
are weak)? Much the same applies to Mode 2 knowledge
and post-academic science: where focused on, say, social
legitimacy and transdisciplinary concerns (e.g., Lee et al., 2013;
Huutoniemi, 2015), one is bound to expect some reviewers to
overlook what others see as pressing contextual and societal
concerns. There are reasons not to address – not only how
interactions shape reviewing – but also who counts as a
‘peer’ and how issues vary across occasions and genres of
review.
Socially motivated criticism oﬀers no alternative to the input–
output or process model. The sharpest challenge is, perhaps,
Pontille and Torny’s (2015) use of French pragmatic sociology.
Rejecting rationalist models, they build on Latour (1987) to treat
peer-review as a technology whose practices/artifacts co-evolve
in the social world. Rejecting mid-twentieth century ideals of
science, they present two ‘tests’ or modes of performance-control.
For Pontille and Torny (2015), peer-review uses practices or
assessment procedures (evaluation tests) that are necessarily in
tension with criteria pertaining to the quality of text, data and
images (validation tests)11.
The Academic Dissenter
In treating peer-review as a normative process that is amenable
to quantitative investigation, experts concur with their negative
verdicts. Peer-review is unreliable, biased and lacks predictive
validity. Yet, the ‘process’ not only takes considerable labor, but it
also shapes the goals, practices and beliefs of aspiring academics.
So how do professionals experience peer-review? The question is
rarely asked and, suprisingly perhaps, surveys tend to be positive;
in Bornmann’s (2011) view, good stories outnumber the bad.
Authors learn from reports –however, unreliable and biased they
are. Indeed, process models may contradict common academic
experience because they fail to identify the de facto functions of
reviewing. Below, I rethink review reports as cognitive resources:
they set enabling/disabling conditions whose tone and content
inﬂuence the author’s response. Though normative, like all
social practices, the structural and interpersonal dimension of
peer-review unite convictions, expert (and other) biases and
social change. As human activity, peer-review varies dramatically
between ﬁelds. Further, just as technology changes, so may peer-
review; habits matter in science too. Scientists develop new ways
of working, new thinking and new products –they develop new
kinds of community.
11In other terms, technological assessment standards (‘validation tests’) co-occur
with the criteria that characterize Ziman’s (2000) ‘real science’ (evaluation tests).
For example, well-presented statistical data may be elegant and signiﬁcant and,
yet, incompatible with desired social outcomes. For Pontille and Torny (2015), not
only are tensions between validation and evaluation inevitable but, crucially, they
inﬂuence reviewers. From a systemic perspective, therefore, choices of wordings,
graphics and data at once ‘report’ (roughly, validate) and contribute to knowledge-
making (evaluation).
SEEKING A LARGER FRAME
Approaching peer-review as quality control is wanting. Much can
therefore be gained from reframing the normative social process.
In part, this is because post-academic science builds on values
that contrast withMerton’s (1942). To twenty-ﬁrst century eyes, it
is striking that scientists were once seen as disinterested observers
who were rewarded for selﬂess acts. As respected people, they
dutifully sought to replace war-time horrors with a new society.
Scientists were well-paid, securely employed and had academic
freedom: they were aided by secretaries, undertook laboratory
tasks, read, and discussed ideas with students. No-one pushed
them to publish, attend conferences or scramble after grants.
Later, “[T]he image of an upright reviewer gave way to one of
a colleague steeped in self-interest, prejudice and beliefs which
formed an integral part of his/her opinion” (Pontille and Torny,
2015, p. 65). Given social change, in discussing CUDOS values,
disinterestedness is often overlooked. What of the other values?
Is organized skepticism challenging? Is it merely checking for
conformity? This matters if, as for Huutoniemi (2015), its focus
is on ‘knowledge claims’. For, while ‘quality’ and ‘originality’ are
often invoked, there is little evidence that these can be identiﬁed.
How many highly cited papers are worth reading? Are they
correlated with prestige (and high impact) journals? As the case
of peer-review shows, science can produce correlations, opinions
and valid and yet, unclear, results12.
Mats Alvesson brings just this logic to his ﬁeld of
organizational science:
“This article aims to place the question ‘do we have anything
meaningful to say?’, more strongly on the agenda when carrying
out and assessing research. I start by pointing out that we, as
a community, often have little to say to anyone outside a small
group of like-minded academics. . . . Much of what I am saying
heremay be less relevant for those struggling to get their bread and
butter, and whose overriding concern may be about their CV and
publication record in order to secure a position—and identity and
status as someone who is a ‘real’ academic. But . . . most people
should be concerned with more than just landing and keeping a
job or experiencing acceptance and membership in academia; and
thus having something to say should be vital” (Alvesson, 2013,
p. 79).
Science changes as much as scientists –in my view, readers
ought to be shocked that leading voices proclaim that many
have nothing to say (and that inﬂuential Journals regard the
work as worthy of publication). However, in turning from the
secrets of art and nature, this is perhaps less surprising. After
all, science increasingly focuses on social practices such as peer-
review. In oﬀering academic status to proponents, such a topic
can also be seen as scientiﬁc mission creep –as a way of leaving
aside foundational issues in the name of social and contextual
results. While opinions and correlations show, repeatedly, that
peer-review fails quality control, the normative framing has
12This is the message: in spite of a huge literature – and many quantitative studies –
the study of peer-reviewproduces valid results that are unclear. While ineﬀective as
quality control, peer-review drives much scientiﬁc quality. Accordingly, I reframe
the practice as constraining cognition and, thus, part of knowledge-making.
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not been scrutinized. This is a scandal because, as every social
scientist knows, all social practices have this status. It is trivial
to call peer-review normative – the same applies to shopping,
electioneering, bathing and mourning. In spite of lip service to
organized skepticism, few have considered the assumptions, set
up debate or sought to challenge input–output logic.
Contexts of the Non-crisis
Peer-review fails its own desiderata. If it does not function as
quality-control, is it a mode of censorship? Is posing such a
question a sign of crisis? While not oﬀering answers, some insight
is gained by asking why the ﬁeld became self-preoccupied.
With globalization, universities in the US, UK, Germany,
and other Western powers ceased to control knowledge
production. New views of knowledge led to the politicization
of academia as business interests and national governments
sought to defend ‘their’ knowledge makers. Money went into
rankings purporting to measure excellence. By treating peer-
review as quality control, bureaucrats oﬀered ‘independent’
justiﬁcations for the uneven resourcing of institutions (e.g.,
in the UK), claiming the reality of knowledge transfer (e.g.,
in the European Union) and the rise of global excellence
(as in China). Especially in the US, the UK and Australia,
political change transformed universities into a service sector
ﬁnanced by student customers. In Science Mart, Mirowski
(2011) paints a shocking view of how research is outsourced,
separated from teaching that is, increasingly, performed by
low paid, junior staﬀ. In the UK, the Blair government linked
public policy with research practice. Using a 1999 White paper,
Modernizing Government, research was funded to generate
evidence supportive of government goals and policy. Further, a
series of Research Assessment Exercises served to “concentrate
funding on a small number of research organizations judged
to be successful on. . . [its] internal criteria, causing the weaker
ones to lose their better leaders and staﬀ and undermining
their access to the human and ﬁnancial resources that will
enable them to improve their performance” (Boaz et al., 2008,
p. 246). Under such pressures, it is to be expected that “some
domains of science tend toward collaboration with power elites”
(Huutoniemi, 2015). Indeed, I left the UK partly as a result of
pressures created by the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE)
and partly because I choose to work with students as, not
customers, but co-constructors of understanding. As peer culture
disappears (Reinhart, 2010), gentlemanly self-regulation is often
replaced by performance driven roles. Indeed, the globalization
of knowledge is itself enough to ensure that science is no
longer dominated by men of a certain class who meet in
the smoking rooms of London clubs –or their 20th century
counterparts (see, Snow, 2012). Changes in society, science
and scientists and an innumerable array of related practices
ensure that peer-review has accrued new functions. To cite
just one set of examples, not only does ‘impact’ inﬂuence
careers but many choose to focus on, not a discipline, but
television appearances, consultancy positions, or coining buzz-
terms (e.g., Mode 2 knowledge). In social psychology, there
may be a tendency to seek out the ‘counter intuitive’ (Shea,
2011). Thus, Diedrik Stapel’s papers suggested that Alpha
females tend to philander and that having a messy desk
can indicate racism. In these cases, however, scandal broke;
an academic had used invented data! Not only does fraud
elude peer-review but, for Shea (2011), ‘addiction to surprising
ﬁndings’ characterizes high impact journals; he cites, among
others, a paper in Psychological Science that ascribes better
decision-making to people with full bladders (Tuk et al., 2011).
While not challenging the work, Shea (2011) ﬁnds the claim
overstated.13 There is a paradox: although peer culture is
disappearing, even re-engineered institutions rely on peer-review
and publishing.
Technological change shapes new practices. Just as the 1960s
invention of Xerox transformed peer-review (once one could
copy manuscripts, they could readily be posted to reviewers),
the internet has driven change (e.g., reviews can be managed
electronically; measures can be made of impact). Given such
results, many universities seek to measure academic ‘success’
by citation indices. Where counts are purely quantitative,
reputation ceases to be linked to prestige journals and, for
this reason, publishers feel threatened. Following their use in
Australia in the 1980s, vested interests shifted the focus to
Journal ranking (for an account, see Pontille and Torny, 2010).
A similar compromise between political economic players shaped
the UK’s Research Excellence Framework (REF). Although
all submissions presented papers for peer-review, this was
a token move: universities admitted or excluded researchers
on the basis of journal citation indices. Bizarrely, journal
‘quality’ became a proxy for scholarly ‘quality’. Not only did
REF privilege some institutions but its indices were biased to
established views. In such a system, Mertonian ideals serve
powerful elites who gain from maintaining the myth that peer-
review is to be seen as disinterested, reliable, unbiased, and
valid.
Vested interests need to invoke quality control. However,
new kinds of peer-review and academic products are also
challenging the establishment. Increasingly, reviewers are paid
(see, Pontille and Torny, 2015) and some have experimented
with open peer-review, post-publication review, and crowd
sourcing. Many editors challenge orthodoxies. Various academic
practices have transformed or abandoned. While the biggest
changes may lie in library use and reading, others are easier
to document. First, given demand for citations, publishing is
much faster. Second, journals have on-line portals, oﬀer pre-
publication services and provide databases that prompt access
to publishers’ other journals. Third, authors are rarely oﬀered
hard copies of publications and, in many cases, editorial decisions
are made with reference to markets (For example, when a new
manager was appointed, Elsevier encouraged (or pushed) 3 of it
4 Linguistics editors to retire). Fourth, open access has become
a scientiﬁc and political issue that has led to the proliferation
of new journals. Though so-called predatory journals attest to
13Both referees dislike the example. One suggests that such a study can be
challenged by testing ‘empirical validation or veriﬁcation’. In a world of real-
science, this might occur. However, it would be hard to fund such a study and,
if one showed that full bladders had little eﬀect on decision making, ﬁnding a
publisher would be diﬃcult. In my view, therefore, Shea’s (2011) voice deserves
to be heard; accordingly, I leave it to the reader to make a judgment.
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how many papers lack epistemic value,14 many new journals
make striking contributions. For example, since its launch in
2006, PloS One has become prominent. Instead of calling for
comments on manuscript scope and innovation, it publishes
on the basis of technical review. As an ‘evolving platform’
PloS One stresses, not claims of originality, but thorough
science. As a result, the platform publishes more articles than
anyone else (31,500 in 2013) and, using social networks, reaches
non-academic circles. Thus, while a normative social process,
peer-review is also (part of) a socially distributed cognitive
technology.
A Clear Picture
Recognition that peer-review does not function as eﬀective
quality control is inseparable from a social, academic and
technological context. Yet, power elites rely on the Mertonian
image. Not only does it legitimize policy moves but as Fitzpatrick
(2011) notes, peer-review serves ‘institutional warranting’.
However, that is only a part of the story. While evidence is weak,
many (or most) academics value peer-review. Far from being
because it is a normative process, this is likely to bear on their
experience of its results. Thus, for Squazzoni et al. (2013), it is
crucial to ‘knowledge generation’ and, for Huutoniemi (2015), it
can be ‘assumed to guarantee good science’. Peer-reviewmay be a
cornerstone of knowledge production.
While peer-review may grant scientiﬁc status to documents
that are ﬂawed or, indeed, merely review opinion and compile
correlations, it serves many scientiﬁc, social, and political
interests (see, Readings, 1996; Mirowski, 2011). It may seem,
therefore, that peer-review is safe; reformers can polish its
image with expressions of concern and promises of change.
Nonetheless, peer-review performs poorly as quality control; nor
does reform address any dissonance between experience and
expert views. I now argue that, once one abandons a 1940s ideal
of science, peer-review ceases to reduce to a social institution
that depends on input–output. Instead, I use systemic cognition
to reframe peer-review as using a social technology whereby all
parties collaborate to manipulate texts, data and images or what
will be termed ‘symbolizations’. Given the power of the latter,
I claim, peer-review has an important role in making scientiﬁc
knowledge.
SYSTEMIC COGNITION: THE BASIS OF
SCIENCE
By deﬁnition cognition enables ﬂexible, adaptive behavior.
It enables people to undertake complex projects by using
institutions to engage with each other and kinds of equipment.
On a systemic view, the sociology of science connects with
distributed cognition (see, Magnus and McClamrock, 2015).
There is, as Robert Giere (2010) emphasizes, a parallel between
science and agriculture: above all, in both kinds of practice,
14Calling it a ‘scientiﬁc plague’, the editors of the Journal of Threatened Taxa have
recently proposed the development of a policy to prevent the citation of papers in
known predatory journals (Raghavan et al., 2015).
a multi-party, multi-agent system generates output. However,
whereas farmers produce potatoes, wheat or coca leaves, scientists
read, undertake experiments and aggregate data, graphics
and inscriptions (‘symbolizations’). Those concerned strive to
improve outcomes in ways that, in agriculture, as in science,
draw on social conditions and the use of cultural products.
Individual activity occurs within domains such as farms and
universities or what Hutchins (2014) calls ‘cognitive ecosystems’.
On this view, one can look beyond the normative by allowing
peer-review to include Gaudet’s (2014) ‘structural relations’ and
Pontille and Torny’s (2015) ‘technology’. Using these models,
Figure 2, presents the two contrasting framings of peer-review.
The black arrows show both process (input–output) and systemic
views of its function –placing them against a background of
scientiﬁc networks.
Publication renders text, data, ﬁgures, and other features of
a document available to knowledge makers in a scientiﬁc ﬁeld.
Importantly, this can inﬂuence both the reputations of those
concerned and later readings of the published copy. The ﬁgure
thus presents extended communities of authors, editors, and
science in general. The arrows represent idealizations: as a social
process, peer-review functions to map a submitted manuscript
onto a decision (framed by community criteria). By contrast,
as systemic cognition, peer-review leads to, not just a reviewer’s
decision, but (in some cases) rewriting and a published product.
By analogy with agriculture, just as a farmer grows crops, if of
epistemic value, this can nurture a discipline or ﬁeld. Publication
is a cognitive event that, for a ﬁeld, marks a ‘change in the
layout of aﬀordances’ (Chemero, 2000): it brings forth new
knowledge and opportunities for knowledge-making. Ideally, one
would examine how author, editor, and reviewers collaborate to
shape the manuscript. For current purposes, however, I focus
on method, the role of data, inscriptions, graphics, etc., and, in
illustration, illustrate how one can address three hypotheses.
Preliminary Remarks on Method
As applied to peer-review, the functional approach of cognitive
science can pursue: (1) What is peer-review for? (2) How does
peer-review work? Within a systemic frame, it is seen as allowing
people to collaborate in reformatting a manuscript that can
inﬂuence knowledge making. While quality control remains a
desideratum, reviewers are also concerned with disciplinary (or
transdisciplinary) knowledge. Of course, the process depends on
values that reﬂect, for example, whether parties aim at reaching
academics and/or non-academic stakeholders. For now, however,
I leave aside issues about science in society to focus on basic
implications of the model
(1) Authors, editors, reviewers and the wide public engage
with publications (and pre-publications) as members of
partly overlapping, partly competing communities.
(2) Even if a pre-publication is submitted electronically,
the editor selects referees, mediates between parties
(including ones not shown in the ﬁgure) and
makes/communices decisions–as well as formulating
views and accompanying advice. Peer-review is
dominated by interpersonal contacts.
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FIGURE 2 | A systemic model of peer-review. The model places author, editor, and referees in overlapping networks and structures. The author’s recursive
re-embodiment of a manuscript connects up thinking, less formal communication, and its more formal counterparts. Where seen in input–output terms, the focus
falls on how a manuscript is evaluated (see, large stippled arrow). As systemic cognition, by contrast, peer-review constrains the activities connecting the submission
of a ‘successful’ draft to its eventual academic publication (see, unbroken black arrow).
(3) Referees link the material to what expertise they have and
their grasp of a journal’s aspirations. They then submit
reports (perhaps following guidelines).
(4) The editor evaluates the reports in making a
decision/recommendation. Normally, the editor sends
both reports and accompanying advice (e.g., what to
prioritize) to the authors.
(5) Where a manuscript is not rejected, an author will
evaluate reports and advice and, on this basis, decide how
to proceed (and whether to resubmit).
(6) Rewriting will draw on discussion with co-authors and
others in his or her community as well as published
sources (or doing experiments) suggested by referees.
(7) Once resubmitted, a manuscript sets oﬀ a cascade
of events. (While the diagram shows an accepted
resubmission, a document may be sent for further
review by the same or diﬀerent referees). There
may be several rounds of resumbission and
re-evaluation.
(8) Once published, a manuscript is amenable for
dissemination. Alongside informal appraisal, this
will aﬀect the reputation of the Journal, the editor,
and author (where referees are public, they too
will be aﬀected). In slow scales, this will alter
future reviewing (and, especially, the selection of
reviewers).
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Far from being sequential, peer-review is multi-scalar
cognitive process. Its recursive evaluations link individual
knowledge – and literacies– with cultural products that realize
(or fail to realize) a community’s values, knowledge, beliefs,
assumptions and standards. Indeed, ‘skepticism’ applies to more
than knowledge claims. On a systemic view, a research program
would link such matters with both the anticipatory nature of
cognition and how, over time, knowledge claims are interpreted.
For now, however, I assume that that a manuscript has already
been submitted.
Since peer-review is multi-scalar, change arises between
manuscript submission and, when accepted, ﬁnal publication.
Pre-publication events thus play out recursively around the solid
black arrow in Figure 2. Later, I discuss three sub-hypotheses:
(1) reviewers use, not organized skepticism, but agonistic
evaluation; (2) recursive re-embodiment enables referees/authors
to negotiate or demand conformity to standard topics/debates,
presentations of a problem space, and, at times, allows
contingencies to transform the product; and (3) rewriting can
alter, among other things, argument structure, knowledge claims,
presentational style, and choices of wordings. However, before
addressing such questions, one faces a challenge. The many
activities that contribute to peer-review have to be matched to
a published outcome. It is necessary to bring the linguistic and
non-linguistic activity of authors, editors, and reviewers together.
Plainly, this is irreducible to the construal of data, images, and
propositions into which a text can be analyzed: just as skilled
farmers produce crops, the expertise of literate scientists shapes
the published product.
Condensing Sense-making
On a systemic view, cognition centers on a project (e.g., how a
ship is navigated or how science uses the Hubble). In focusing on
such achievements, what happens does not reduce to individual
knowledge, skills and beliefs. In peer-review, therefore, one must
consider what happens to the data, inscriptions and graphics
(symbolizations) that appear as a document. While a computer
metaphor attributes processing to mental states that co-vary with
physical structures, this philosophical view oﬀers little to the
study of distributed cognitive systems. In spite of a conservative
view of language (see, Steﬀensen, 2009), Clark (2008) allows
thinking and gesture to involve objects that contribute to
believing, doing and perceiving. Even Aizawa (2015) allows that
bodies contribute to cognition in ‘surprising’ ways. While the
nature of embodiment is a current topic of debate (see, Shapiro,
2010), its role in human intelligence is beyond dispute. Indeed, on
a radical view, agent-environment interactions shape all cognitive
events (e.g., Chemero, 2011). For current purposes, however, it
is enough, ﬁrst, that neither minds nor brains depend entirely
on inner stores of data; second, that language is irreducible
to a code (e.g., Love, 2004; Cowley, 2011). In today’s terms,
while embrained, human thinking is also embodied, embedded,
enacted, and extended: bodies rely on attuning to each other
and the world. Language too arises as people embody their
dealings with each other, objects, and social practices. Over time,
as speaking/hearing beings, agency develops as they become
persons who orient to beliefs, doubts and knowledge. Thus, while
individuals rely on certainties, facts are crucial to human form of
life.
In science, knowledge is both social and inseparable from
practices and beliefs. Thus, in laboratories and libraries, cultural
ecologies (Hutchins, 2014) have a powerful inﬂuence on how
people feel, think and act. Perceiving an utterance-act draws on –
not just facts – but how physics shape its likely role in coordinated
action (Cowley, 2014). Thus, for example, the physics of ‘Boo!’ or
‘That can’t be true’ aﬀect how such an utterance act is evaluated.
More strikingly, perhaps, reading is anticipatory as attested by
measures of ﬁxation-speech intervals (Järvilehto et al., 2011)
While the embodied nature of languaging –and language –is
increasingly studied (e.g., Linell, 2009; Thibault, 2011; Steﬀensen,
2013) less attention has hitherto been given to how linguistic
practices can sustain knowledge, attitudes and beliefs. In treating
peer-review as just such a practice, I build on Kravchenko’s
(2006, 2007, 2009) bio-cognitive approach. Like Linell (2004), he
contrasts evanescent speech with the perduring nature of written
marks. However, turning from the distributed and the dialogical,
Kravchenko (2006, 2007, 2009) focuses on the ‘symbolizations’
that come to constitute new kinds of understanding. As further
explained below, this is because, unlike acts of speech, visible
patterns can be preserved in manuscripts or, indeed, transmitted
in stable and compressed form (as digitized code). Accordingly,
the ‘same’ patterns can appear under many perspectives and
be evaluated in many contexts. In pursuing this view, ﬁrst,
he contrasts talk and literacies (e.g., sending text messages
or reviewing manuscripts) and, then, he stresses that human
Language (with a capital ‘l’) glues together social practice.
Kravchenko (2007, pp. 662–663) uses Russian tradition:
“language is an activity that involves all the functions which
make humans human. And language is an activity that generates
the means for its realization in concord with the diverse
functions possessed by language” (Zvegintsev, 1996, p. 50
Kravchenko, 2007). By extending the ecology, Language connects
speech, attention and gesture with solo and collective modes
of action. As peer-review uses literacies (and other capacities),
the practice makes extensive use of inscriptions. People construe
manuscripts against individual experience by drawing on
Language to evaluate data, graphics and inscriptions. In peer-
review, application of symbolizations can thus be extended to
digits, quantitative data and pixelated images. While unlike
inscriptions in that, for example, images cannot be ‘read aloud’,
these all serve as replicable constraints (Raczaszek-Leonardi,
2012); their perduring nature transforms collective memory
(Donald, 1991). Symbolizations evoke Language that, like a
living system (Kravchenko, 2007), enables persons to ﬁne tune
actions, perceptions, thoughts, and beliefs. Humans act and
think partly under collective control (see, Raczaszek-Leonardi
and Cowley, 2012), or, for Kravchenko (2007), “Once we view
society as a unity of interactions, we see the crucial sustaining
role of a linguistic ecology.” In science, symbolizations deﬁne
frameworks, assumptions, procedures and ways of measuring; as
they perdure, take on what Craik (1943) terms objective validity
(e.g., E =mc2). However, while Craik (1943) appeals to the brain,
the bio-cognitive alternative emphasizes a history of recursive
coordination that, in Maturana’s (1978) andMaturana and Varela
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(1980) terms, allows people to develop consensual domains and
social communities. Over a history of co-ordinations, people
come to observe what is said and done: observations of actions
(e.g., measures) enable scientists to evaluate knowledge claims.
In peer-review recursive activities connect expert experience,
symbolizations, and observations. As with cities, laws and
local customs, symbolizations link normative practices with a
kaleidoscope of senses. While bounded in rationality, people
draw on laws, architectures and verbal patterns. Like institutions,
these appear non-temporal (a person revisits an arrangement of
letters, a legal judgment or a dwelling) as people glue together
domains of human life. In theoretical culture (Donald, 1991),
symbolizations dominate modes of action as diverse as, say, legal,
religious and scientiﬁc practice.
While some call symbolizations ‘external representations’15
Kravchenko (2009) argues that, even if they are stable,
symbolizations evoke connotations. They index, not just
denotata, but also individual experience. In illustration, he turns
to the etymology of συμβoλoν, symbolization, an inscription
that alludes to how ‘marks’ are ‘thrown together’. In a
world of Language, the use of writing-systems can aggregate
cultural products. Far from relying on coding (or invariant
propositional knowledge), individuals link symbolizations with
both usage and their own experience (e.g., of data analysis).
Although symbolizations (and images) are empty, they perdure
as anchors of experience (that varies across communities).
In time, symbolizations are conventionalized, regularized, and
contextualized to sustain social practices; further, they can be
organized around complex historical practices and, as a result,
granted a very precise sense.
In science, symbolizations enable the ascent of Mount
Improbable16 or, in short, enable much knowledge-making.
In simple cases, this is because procedures ground complex
knowing. In algebra, for example, x + 2 = 7 is a symbolization
of “x + 2 = 7”. In bio-cognitive terms, its sense depends on
how an observer orients to Language. For a mathematician, it
can be seen as a denoter that calls forth a rule of inverses:
this ‘explains’ how a numerically literate person can see that it
entails a denotatum symbolized by “the number 5”. Crucially,
one can follow the procedure without ‘knowing’ the description.
The denotation is equivalent to acting in accordance with
a rule (seeing that x = 5). To come to understand why x
is 5 is a considerable feat. However, knowledge making also
draws on what Maturana calls connotations (see, Kravchenko,
2007). This can be illustrated in relation to uses of the
equation, E = mc2. In physics, this identiﬁes a mass-energy
relation. Roughly, a denoter identiﬁes a universal proportionality
factor whereby equivalent amounts of energy and mass are
equal to the speed of light squared. Yet, in a television
studio, say, E = mc2 can be evocative: it may loosely suggest
15When one invokes ‘external representation’, one focuses on forms and denotata
(for discussion, see Kirsh, 2010). In contrast, symbolizations are perceived at an
instant –for Peirce (1982), they are tokens that map onto types (e.g., sound-
patterns, letters, graphics).
16Dawkins (1997) uses this metaphor to describe his gene-centered view of natural
selection; here I use it to describe how, in cultural time, communities settle on
scientiﬁc content.
‘intelligence’ or science. Indeed, as exempliﬁed on the previous
page, the symbolization can serve to evoke Craik’s concept
of ‘objective validity’. Symbolizations condense connotations
while connecting with a community’s denotata. This is possible
because: (1) they draw on experience; (2) they perdure; (3) they
allow many kinds of agreement consensus; and (4) in time, they
generate conventions, arguments, procedures, and expectations.
As a result, symbolizations warrant inferences and modes of
coordination that reach far beyond ‘interpretation’. Finally, while
Kravchenko (2007) limits use of ‘symbolization’ to ideographic
and alphabetic systems, I extend the usage to digital and graphic
ways of presenting data. Given perduration, symbolizations
become replicable constraints that detach interpretations from
a material substrate. Their non-local values contribute to
writing, mathematics, music, maps and so on. Symbolizations
like “E = mc2” allow diachronic functions and community-
based knowledge. At any time, a symbolization can bring forth
individual senses and/or hint at/specify denotata.
Since symbolizations are so much more than symbols (which,
by deﬁnition, lack connotations), I now turn to how they
contribute to the practices of peer-review and, thus, knowledge
making.
The Power of Symbolizations
Having presented symbolizations as replicable constraints that
use writing-systems or algorithms to digitize data and graphics,
I return to the systemic perspective on peer-review. In a cognitive
frame, its multi-scalar activities are seen as allowing the recursive
reformatting of aggregates of symbolizations. Accordingly, I turn
to how a submission becomes a publication and, in section “A
First Sketch of How Peer-review Constrains Cognition”, revisit
the claims mentioned (viz., agonistic evaluation, recursive re-
embodiment, and authors aggregate perduring symbolizations).
Once seen as an epistemic process, peer-review is traced, in the
ﬁrst place, to how experts link their reading of a submission to a
scientiﬁc community’s procedures and ways of using Language.
As in censorship, peer reviewers ﬁx what is not to be written (or
published). Second, referees do not need much ‘understanding’
of the argument. Indeed, given perduration, symbolizations are
tools or, in Maturanian terms, contribute to recursive activity
in a consensual domain whose span reaches into the referee’s
community. Where people orient consistently to values, they
stabilize, facts, content and bundles of assumptions, metaphors
and values. Much can be gained by aligning practices with
symbolizations and, by so doing, binding normative activity,
social technology and ways of legitimizing outcomes. This is
possible, unlike speech, symbolizations draw on historicity;
given relative invariance, they act as non-local resources that
enhance induction, deduction and abduction (and thus grant
‘collective memory’). While such powers are embodied –and
inseparable from aﬀect –symbolizations connect up webs of
knowledge. An aggregate of symbolizations thus evokes many
‘readings’ and modes of development. Given a history of
recursive activity, an author can hone symbolizations by using
referee reports to bring new criteria to bear on writing: a
document’s content can be revised, reinterpreted and redeﬁned.
Peer-review thus serves both authors and wider communities.
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Documents shape structural relations between participants
and, by using symbolizations, unexpected consequences are
common.
Symbolizations have the power to change future knowledge
claims. This is because, while frames become established, they are
always contested. Symbolizations link impersonal expertise with
individual experience: they can be read as conferring/denying
status to theories, institutions and even persons. As Ziman
(2000) stresses, what counts as scientiﬁc knowledge varies across
disciplinary (and interdisciplinary) ﬁelds. If, in macro-physics,
symbolizations hone law-based predictions, in other ﬁelds their
uses are less readily deﬁned. At times, indeed, dissensus may
be more important than consensus. Indeed, this is precisely
how I view the mainstream ‘object’ of peer-review research.
While grounded 20 years of intensive research that treat it as
a normative process, it has become clear that peer-review is
neither reliable, impartial, or the basis for predictive validity.
The italic symbolizations present hard won collective knowledge
and, as such compress correlations and opinions that have been
developed right across the ﬁeld (e.g., Bedeian, 2003; Bornmann,
2011; Gaudet, 2014). They ﬁx content or what, for peer-review
‘experts’, currently counts as knowledge: as such, even without so
called ‘hard’ evidence, symbolizations delimit a problem space
and, thus, deﬁne a likely empirical search space. By turning to the
voice of academic dissenters, I propose a reframing of the study
of peer-review that opens up epistemic questions. My suggestion
relaxes these constraints by linking peer-review to the making of
scientiﬁc knowledge.
A First Sketch of How Peer-review
Constrains Cognition
Since peer-review transforms documents, referees strive to
inﬂuence how symbolizations are aggregated. As recursive
activity, peer-review shapes what becomes collective memory. In
framing this as systemic cognition, the method is illustrated by
pilot work. Next, I describe review reports of a draft of this paper
against three exemplary hypotheses:
(1) Agonistic evaluation is crucial to peer-review and the
framing of knowledge claims
(2) Recursive re-embodiment enables referees to seek (or
demand) conformity to standard views of topics/debates,
familiar presentation of a problem space, and, at times, to
set oﬀ contingencies that change the ﬁnal product.
(3) Rewriting can lead to, for example, relatively ﬁxed
(a) argument structure; (b) knowledge claims; (c)
presentational style; and (d) choices of wordings
As the author, I was struck by the reviews for two main
reasons. First, in spite of my (unchanged) title, neither referee
grasped the paper’s hypothesis –that peer-review constrains
cognition.17 Second, neither commented on what I intended
17One read its hypothesis as “Symbolization inﬂuences later behavior and human
life and peer-review is conceived as ‘Language’, which has normative inﬂuences
over human beings”. The other referee claims to ‘ﬁnd it diﬃcult to summarize
the author’s view which is both that peer-review is unﬁt for the purpose of quality
assurance and, yet, “crucial to knowledge generation” and ‘assumed to guarantee
to be the paper’s main contributions. They left aside my
reading of Bornmann (2011) and, generally, the literature on
peer-review as well as the surprising claim that academic
publications are, not texts (or sets of propositions), but aggregates
of symbolizations. Accordingly, I focused these issues while
responding to what I deem to be agonistic comments. In
that these do not address knowledge claims, they do not
represent organized skepticism: rather, both referees stress my
failure to establish the paper’s main hypothesis. Their comments
include:
Referee 1: “I am a bit troubled by the structure of your paper
. . . ” I really had problems whether your paper was focused on
issues of peer-review, or . . . “coordination between peer-review
and cognition” . . . “the last paragraph is not clear” . . . “Provide
more empirical support for this . . .”
Referee 2: “the writing is unnecessarily sloppy” . . . “I ﬁnd it
diﬃcult to summarize the author’s own view” . . . “the author
could be said to replace one strawman by another” . . . “there is
a distinct and almost systematic lack of clarity in some places
that could be considered a “fundamental ﬂaw” . . .. This includes
many “rhetorical remarks that are made in passing and that are
not backed up by argument or reference.” . . . “too many, in my
opinion, instances of vagueness” . . . “statements that are ‘hard to
swallow’ . . .” I actually have no idea what is meant “cognition
echoes Descartes’s dualist legacy and, today, the computational
theory of mind” . . . [such] issues “are not as clear cut as they
appear in this manuscript” . . . X is “another example of a
statement that might be well received in talk in a pub” . . . “who is
shocked by this?”18
They contest neither my reading of the literature on peer-
review nor the reframing of what happens as recursive activity
that leads to the re-aggregation of symbolizations. While not
the place to document my response in detail, the comments
evoke a negative aﬀective valence. They prompted me to make
many revisions. Speciﬁcally, in proposing changes in the tone
or status of various passages, the reports set oﬀ a reiterated
recursive process (the symbolizations of the referee reports
focus my attention on aggregates of symbolizations that, when
reread, induced me to reformat the aggregates of symbolizations
in order to achieve less negative eﬀects). This recursive re-
embodiment forced re-engagement with my expertise –and my
grasp of my aims –as I re-embody the writing. Though the results
are amenable to propositional analysis as sentences and text,
these derive from an aﬀectively driven statement of expertise
that re-embodies, and extends, my understanding. Of course,
the referees do not ignore ‘content’; in this case, however,
their concern was less with what I was proposing than an
attempt to place it in relation to standard views of topics/debates
and the current problem space of cognitive science. Strikingly
(for the author) neither referee gave any weight to my claim
that cognition is best deﬁned in terms of the conditions
good science’. The referee concluded that the ‘author could be said to set up one
strawman to be replaced by another’.
18These comments refer tomuch shorter draft of this paper –one that diﬀers greatly
from that presented here. Crucially, reviewers use an agonistic tone evenwhen they
are focused on neither content nor argument. This, I claim, is part of knowledge-
making.
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that enable (and disable) ﬂexible, adaptive behavior. Instead, I
read:
Referee 1: Weight should be given to systemic cognition and
‘conceiving the action within and between systems’ as well as
‘oﬀering description of the systemic process’ and ‘exploring the
cited literature further’ as well as giving ‘empirical support to the
types of analysis performed, context and limits of the evaluation
and giving ‘detailed presentation of input–output models’.
Referee 2: Asks if it is important to establish consensus (saying
that s/he may not be on the same page about this) . . . wants
clarity about Descartes and the computational theory of mind . . .
asks if it is true that computational models of ‘mind’ have been
abandoned and points out that, in the extended mind theory,
computation is still central.
In addressing such points, my resubmission neither reduces
cognition to interactions within and between systems (rather,
it focuses on what enables behavior) nor turns to the theory
of extended mind. (No-one traces peer-review to a neural, or
‘mental’, domain). Rather, I chose to stress that symbolizations
exploit, on the one hand, Language and, on the other, individual
embodiment.19 Further, referee 1 says that s/he “expected a
new formalization of the relationships between peer-review and
cognition.” While at odds with deﬁning cognition in terms of
conditions that enable/disable the aggregating of symbolizations,
this advice drove the paper’s most important changes. I explicitly
contrasted the ‘normative’ input–output model of peer-review
(Figure 1) with one presenting it as giving rise to an outcome
based in recursive re-embodiment (Figure 2). Further, since
neither referee commented on symbolizations I stressed that,
unlike texts or discourse, symbolizations have a constitutive role
in the making of scientiﬁc knowledge.While amenable to analysis
as propositions, symbolizations evoke both Language and also
individual experience. As part of normative social process (i.e.,
social behavior), they bind together interpersonal meanings,
aﬀect and impersonal norms. Given their relative invariance, they
connect aﬀect, orientations to the world, values and expectations.
Like Ziman (2000), I explicitly ascribe scientiﬁc knowledge to
groups; cultural ecosystems link statements and procedures with
objective validity to many bundles of beliefs, values, rituals and
modes of proceeding. Scientiﬁc knowledge is – necessarily –
distributed: it cannot be ‘in’ symbolizations (or propositions)
but arises as persons link replicable constraints to procedurally
based experience. Seen as a cognitive ecosystem, peer-review is
like using the Hubble telescope or acting to bring a ship into port:
an author cooperates with others while reconﬁguring aggregates
of symbolizations. For example, changes aﬀect: (a) argument
structure; (b) knowledge claims; (c) presentational style; and (d)
choices of wordings.
The resubmission has a more explicit argument structure (and
is about 4000 words longer): the main structural changes are as
follows:
19Reviewing also prompts themuting ofmy authorial voice: I reluctantly admit that
even ‘weak’ (or computational) views of ‘embodiment’ views ﬁt the hypothesis. In
principle, people (or, if they exist, minds) might exploit the internal equivalents
to ‘symbolizations’. Such a view would also have to explain how people/minds
co-represent circumstantial aspects, ecosystemic connotations and, in some cases,
covariant relations to practices and measures of objective validity.
(1) I drew a distinction between regarding peer-review as
a set of practices that constrain cognition (by enabling
ﬂexible adaptive behavior) and hypotheses that depend
on a bio-cognitive view of symbolizations (in the section,
Cognition and Knowledge);
(2) I added new sections to present how a systemic view
can be applied to peer-review and what this implies for
method (in the section, Systemic Cognition: The Basis of
Science and Preliminary Remarks on Method).
(3) I substantially revised the current section by adding a pilot
study –showing that peer-review is cognitive as well as
normative (in the section, A First Sketch of How Peer-
review Constrains Cognition).
Ironically, while referee 2 claimed to be unable to formulate
my view, I fully endorse his/her summary of the paper. I oﬀer
neither an argument nor a personal view of peer-review: in the
referee’s terms, I see the literature as like meeting a series of
‘straw men’. Further, while peer-review is wanting as quality
control, the referee correctly observes that I view peer-review
as ‘knowledge generation’ and likely to ‘guarantee good science’.
Like Ziman (2000), moreover, I regard good science as a real
good (not a straw man) and, by way of emphasis, have extended
my use of this perspective on real science. While the state of
the art fails to establish the importance of peer-review, I have
attributed this to its normative assumptions. It is likely, I argue,
that science also enacts recursive social process. Indeed, authors
link a changing draft with both their experience of Language
and the referees’ reports: putting these together, they re-aggregate
symbolizations. Further, given that I regard real science as
important, I have not toned down my style. Far from seeing it
as another straw man, I have added evidence and defended my
claims.20 I endorse Ziman’s (2000) view that ‘value free’ science is
a myth: values permeate both real science and its post-academic
successor (perhaps, these are granted too prominent a role in
the latter). Finally, regards choices of wordings, I focus on two
issues: ﬁrst, I claim (and repeat) that cognition can be deﬁned
around the enabling/disabling conditions of ﬂexible adaptive
behavior. Accordingly, peer-review is as social as it is individual –
ﬂexibility is due to more than neural or (‘mental’) agility. Second,
I have increased the theoretical weight given to the concept
of symbolization. Without perduring replicable constraints that
mesh individual experience with impersonal patterns and shared
procedures, I suggest that there could be no scientiﬁc knowledge.
Precisely because it results in aggregates of symbolizations,
science is increasingly dominated by technologies. It is non-
trivial that increasing use is made of internet platforms, rules
and transdisciplinary encounters between editors, authors, and
reviewers. Indeed, this clariﬁes why a person does not merely
‘write/review’ a paper or ‘perform/check’ experimental and
statistical procedures. As Pontille and Torny (2015) stress,
reviewers play the role of disclosing how they perceive content
(e.g., the process model of peer-review), develop perspectives,
oﬀer evidence and get the author to engage with other views.
20Although I have cut the claim saying that ‘most new ideas are wrong’, this is not
because I think it is false or important; rather, it is for reasons having to do with the
overall coherence of the argument.
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Ultimately, social technology aids in shaping a body of coherent
work –an aggregate of symbolizations that spreads across a
meshwork of texts and communities. Thus literacies –and
individual skills in orienting to Language – lie at the core of
peer-review. The same goes for agonistic attitudes: science is
based in emotional commitment. In exchange between parties,
some structural relations must be dismissed, some ignored and
some used to prompt constructive disagreement (e.g., Harnad,
1979). In reviewing, all parties can gain personal knowledge
which, traditionally, can be addressed to the concerns of a sub-
community or ﬁeld that are orchestrated by an editor.
REAL SCIENCE REVISITED
Science demands belief in scientiﬁc quality. Far from relying
on neutral values or objective practices, attitudes have a crucial
role in the making of knowledge that, for a community, is
accorded objective validity. Arguably, this is why peer-review
matters to science and, thus, the world’s knowledge sector.
With such ideas in mind, I used mainstream literature to
rethink the practice as a multi-scalar cognitive process. Although
quality control matters, the function of peer review may be
largely epistemic. Where the quality of science is under threat,
other means are needed for quality control. Peer-review is, or
should be, deeply concerned with the boundaries of scientiﬁc
knowledge. As more than a normative process, I suggest that
the recursive re-embodiment of review and writing rely on
agonistic means of preserving scientiﬁc integrity. Crucially, one
can investigate how symbolizations are aggregated in systems
that link human agents, embodied activity and technology.
In pilot work, I stress agonistic reviewing and, while sharing
Ziman’s (2000) view that it is too early to evaluate post-academic
science, I think that much can be gained from studying how,
in fact, peer-review works. It is possible, for example, that some
reviewers (and journals) focus on issues of knowledge/methods
and others on the weighting given to favored social, economic
and ethical outcomes. Indeed, this makes a parallel between
science and agriculture so telling. By analogy, while some
reviewers focus more quality science, others focus on what they
think consumers want. For this reason, much post-academic
science faces Alvesson’s (2013) problem of having nothing to
say –especially if the goal as that of generating ‘evidence’ for
predeﬁned political, social and economic desiderata. Where
servicing such a demand, peer-review is at odds with Ziman’s
(2000) real science; growth of knowledge becomes more like
cultivating coca leaves than managing the harvest of wheat or
sorghum.
In stressing that peer-review is neither reliable, fair, nor a
basis for predictive judgements. I say something that many
will not want to hear. Even if this view should count as
knowledge, power elites are likely to cling to Mertonian ideals.
Pretending that peer-review is quality control suits many
politicians, administrators, media and commercial interests. In
a military image, peer-review is at the frontline of science.
Further, while the topic is under-researched, many academics
seem to support peer-review. Even if peer-culture is vanishing,
its multi-scalar activities can be used to grasp what matters
to a community, discipline or transdisciplinary ﬁeld. What
a sociologist calls ‘knowledge generation’ is, by hypothesis,
amenable to redescription as the recursive aggregation of
symbolizations that relevant players judge to be acceptable.
From the systemic perspective, peer-review is epistemic. While
enforcing conformity, the activity brings forth oversights,
contradictions, and anomalies. Even if some parties focus on
personal goals and ﬁnancial rewards, peer-review serves bigger
scientiﬁc needs. By maintaining agonistic ways of defending
hard-earned knowledge, much can be achieved. On one hand,
it can privilege data sets and ensembles of facts that drive
the assumptions, practices and frames of a scientiﬁc ﬁeld; on
the other, the process can seed dissensus and its unpredictable
outcomes. By hypothesis, peer-review is important in making
scientiﬁc knowledge.
Science masks tensions between the known and the unknown:
metaphors (e.g., input–output) and truisms (peer-review is
a social process) hide ignorance. Much is gained from
scrutiny of, not just knowledge claims, but of inconsistencies
in argument, metaphors, rhetoric, and the sloppy use of
wordings. But, this is not organized skepticism. In the
resulting recursive events, aﬀect has a major role: peer-
review leads to collisions and chance events that set oﬀ what
Whewell (1847) called the colligation of inference and Peirce
(1982) normative extensions of perception. Peer-review prompts
abductive processes that challenge opinions, knowledge claims,
assumptions and metaphors. Bringing disorder to science, it
permits non-conformity in those who care about science,
content and their applications. Real science, and the best of
its successors, is concerned as much with trust as it is in
plugging research gaps. For Ziman (2000) a key motto is:“Be
original”. Others, prefer to challenge the status quo. Provided
that such pleasures are tempered by killjoy spirit, one can
redeﬁne problem spaces or, metaphorically, open up paths that
can be used to ascend Mount Improbable. The normative power
of peer-review can be rethought as linking embodiment and
aﬀect with social technologies and cultural products. On this
view, symbolizations are crucial to all cultural ecosystems that
depend on epistemic activity. A clearer view of peer-review may
contribute to shaping events in the front line of the knowledge
sector and, perhaps, resolving conﬂicts between Ziman’s (2000)
real science and post-academic research whose primary concern
is with meeting the needs of political, social and economic
forces.
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